Security Track ยท 0 โ†’ Hero

IT/OT Security: don't be the headline

Your PLC has the security posture of a 1998 web server and the explosive potential of, well, an actual explosion. IT security protects data. OT security makes sure the thing that can boil, crush, electrocute or flood a city keeps doing exactly โ€” and only โ€” what you told it to. This is the speed-run from "what's a Modbus?" to "not getting a federal advisory named after my plant."

๐Ÿ™ƒ the CIA flip๐ŸŽ‚ Purdue model๐Ÿ“ฐ war stories๐ŸŽฎ attack sim
01 ยท Everything you know is upside down

In OT, the security rulebook flips

IT security ranks its priorities C-I-A: Confidentiality first (don't leak the data), then Integrity, then Availability. OT flips it to A-I-C โ€” and bolts Safety on top. Nobody dies if a spreadsheet leaks. People die if a turbine over-speeds or the chlorine dose triples. Tap a card to see the priorities.

๐Ÿ’ป IT world reboot & move on

C
ConfidentialityDon't leak the customer database.
I
IntegrityDon't let data get tampered with.
A
AvailabilityNice to have. There's always a maintenance window.

โš™๏ธ OT world reboot = outage

S
SafetyThe process must never harm humans or the environment. Non-negotiable.
A
AvailabilityThe line runs 24/7. "Have you tried turning it off and on again?" gets you fired.
I
IntegrityThe PLC must do exactly what you told it โ€” Stuxnet broke this one.
C
ConfidentialityLast. Who cares if someone reads a tank levelโ€ฆ until they change it.

๐Ÿฉน You can't "Patch Tuesday" a blast furnace. Patching means a planned shutdown, sometimes a vendor flight and a 3-day revalidation. So OT runs ancient, unpatched software on purpose โ€” and compensates with isolation, not updates.

๐Ÿฆ• 20โ€“40 year lifespans. That controller was commissioned when "cyber" meant a chat room. It speaks protocols (Modbus, DNP3) with zero authentication โ€” they were designed for a trusted wire, not the internet.

02 ยท The Purdue Model

The layer cake that keeps the internet away from the valves

The Purdue model stacks a plant into levels โ€” the messy internet at the top, the spinning/heating/flowing physical reality at the bottom. The golden rule: traffic moves between adjacent layers, never end-to-end, and a DMZ sits in the middle so IT and OT never talk directly. Click a layer โ€” see what lives there and what the attacker wants from it.

The Level 3.5 DMZ is the whole ballgame. Almost every real OT breach is a story of an attacker landing in IT (top) and finding a path all the way down to Level 1/0 โ€” because someone left a door propped open through the layers.

03 ยท How they actually get in

Six doors, all embarrassingly often unlocked

Forget Hollywood. OT attackers rarely need a Stuxnet-grade 0-day. They need a password that's still 1111 and an HMI that's googleable. Here's the real menu.

04 ยท War stories

The hall of fame (and shame)

Real incidents, what went wrong, and the one lesson each burned into the industry. Notice how few involve genius hacking and how many involve a propped-open door.

05 ยท The simulation

๐ŸŽฎ Defend the Riverside Water Plant

You run a water-treatment plant. Somewhere out there, a bored hacktivist wants to dump lye into the supply (hi, Oldsmar). An attack is a chain โ€” break any link and it stops. Toggle your defenses, hit Launch attack, and watch how far they get. Defense-in-depth means you don't need every layer perfect โ€” you need the chain broken somewhere.

your defenses โ†’ toggle them on/off
the kill chain โ†’
๐Ÿ“ฐ NEWSWORTHINESS0%
Pick your defenses and launch an attack. Pro tip: turn everything off first and watch the carnage, then fix it one layer at a time.
06 ยท Defense in depth

IEC 62443: zones, conduits & not trusting the wire

The simulator is the standard, dressed up. IEC 62443 โ€” the OT security bible โ€” says: carve the plant into zones of equal trust, allow traffic only through defined conduits between them, and assume any zone can be hostile. It's the Purdue model with a rulebook and an auditor.

๐Ÿงฑ Zones โ€” group assets of the same trust/risk (the SCADA zone, the safety zone, the DMZ). A breach in one shouldn't flood the others.

๐Ÿš‡ Conduits โ€” the only sanctioned paths between zones, with a firewall/data-diode policing exactly which protocols may pass.

๐Ÿ”ข Security Levels (SL 1โ€“4) โ€” SL1 stops accidents; SL4 resists a nation-state with big resources. You target the SL each zone actually needs.

๐Ÿงญ The one-sentence version: an attacker who gets into one place should be able to do almost nothing from there. Every wall you saw in the sim โ€” no exposure, MFA, EDR, segmentation, OT monitoring, an independent safety system โ€” is just defense-in-depth refusing to put all its eggs in one firewall.

07 ยท You're a hero now

The 10 OT-security commandments

Tape these above the engineering workstation. Most breaches you just read about would have died on commandment 1, 2 or 4.

  1. Thou shalt not expose an HMI, PLC or SCADA box to the public internet. Go check Shodan. We'll wait.
  2. Thou shalt change the default password. 1111, admin/admin and 0000 are not passwords, they're invitations.
  3. Thou shalt segment IT from OT with a real DMZ โ€” no flat networks, no "temporary" cable that's been there since 2014.
  4. Thou shalt put MFA on every remote-access path, and kill shared TeamViewer logins with fire.
  5. Thou shalt patch the edge (routers, VPNs, firewalls) even when thou canst not patch the PLC.
  6. Thou shalt keep the Safety Instrumented System on its own island โ€” never reachable from the control network.
  7. Thou shalt monitor OT traffic; a PLC suddenly speaking new Modbus commands is a scream, not a whisper.
  8. Thou shalt control USB drives. The air gap is a vibe, not a control (ask Iran).
  9. Thou shalt keep offline, tested backups โ€” and an incident-response plan that doesn't live only in IT's head.
  10. Thou shalt assume breach. The question isn't "if someone gets in," it's "how little can they do when they do."
08 ยท Field kit

Take the plant home with you

Knowledge that closes with the browser tab isn't worth much. Here's the printable field kit: an IEC 62443-aligned hardening checklist (grouped by control family), the 10-commandments poster, and a one-page "we think we're breached" runbook. Tape them above the engineering workstation.

๐Ÿ“ฅ

OT Security Field Kit

Hardening checklist ยท commandments poster ยท incident quick-reference. One click to print or save as PDF.

๐Ÿ“„ Open the Field Kit โ†’
09 ยท Certification exam

Earn your certificate

Ten questions, drawn from the whole lesson. Score 80% or higher to pass and unlock a personalised certificate of completion you can print or save as PDF. No peeking โ€” answers are revealed only after you submit.